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Introduction
This study analyses the development of the biological standard of living in Germany under the National Socialist regime before the outbreak of the Second World War. The "biological standard of living" refers to those aspects of a broadly defined living standard that relate to human biology, such as mortality, morbidity, and quality of nutrition as measured by the physical growth of the human organism. These indicators have considerable advantages over the use of GDP per capita as a measure of well-being. 1 Although real GDP per capita increased rapidly in Nazi Germany, most scholars now agree that it has, in fact, little to say about the actual welfare of the population, inasmuch as most of the additional income generated helped finance state expenditures, including its substantial rearmament programs.
In addition, the price and wage controls that were put into effect also invalidate, or at least call into question, most price indices. 2 Under such circumstances, the concept of the biological standard of living is of particular interest, for the response mechanisms of the human organism do not change when a political and economic regime switches from democracy, with a market economy, to totalitarianism and active state intervention. A rise in mortality is an unequivocal signal that important aspects of the living standard are deteriorating.
Longevity, health, and the quality of nutrition are essential components of the utility function.
When those components deviate from the standard GDP per capita measure, a more detailed study of human welfare is likely to yield results worthy of note.
The following section surveys indicators of nutrition, mortality, and morbidity. Section 2 examines those causes for the development of these three variables that are not based on the nutrition-mortality relationship, including public health. Section 3 presents evidence that protein deficiency can play a role in mortality even if nutritional circumstances are relatively favourable. Section 4 considers the effects of autarchy and food-pricing regulation policies on regional nutritional status and mortality, and section 5 concludes.
The "early years of the Nazi regime" covers the period between 1933 and 1937, that is, before the incorporation of Austria and prior to the atrocities of the so-called Kristallnacht in 1938. To include that year or the war period would obscure the issue of the impact of persecution and war on living standards. For, even though persecution was intense prior to 1938, its demographic impact was insufficient to account for the decline in population we report below. 3
The development of the biological standard of living

Mortality and Morbidity
The crude death rate in Germany, as in Europe declined until 1932 . 4 However, 1932 marked a turning point: German death rates started to increase, whereas the European average continued to decrease. This was even the case relative to such neighbouring countries as the Netherlands and Denmark, with a low-mortality regime. 5 110  100  100  1929  126  134  107  112  105  109  1930  110  114  91  108  95  95  1931  112  123  96  114  99  97  1932  108  120  90  110  98  93  1933  112  123  88  106  93  97  1934  109  118  84  104  91  94  1935  118  117  87  111  93  102  1936  118  121  87  110  92  102  1937  117  124  88  108  92  101  1938  117  116  85  103  89  101 Notes: The European death rate is the unweighted average of the death rates of 20 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, England and Wales, Scotland, Yugoslavia. Source: Mitchell (1992) , pp. 114-120. The age-specific death rates increased, after having declined markedly in the 1920s, in all age groups except those of infants and of young adults aged 15 to 30 years. Children (age 5-15) suffered the most. In stark contrast, age-specific mortality declined markedly in England of the 1930s in almost all age categories. 1920 1923 1926 1929 1932 1935 1938 1941 1944 1947 1950 1953 1956 1959 Rates per 100,000 Inh. : 1920 -1938 : German Empire (1925 -1934 without Saarland), 1938 -1944 : territory as of 31. December, 1937 , 1946 -1960 : Federal Republic of Germany (1946 without Lindau, Saarland and Berlin-West, 1947 without Saarland and Berlin-West, 1948 . Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1972), p. 119. Furthermore, high morbidity is observable in some contagious disease categories. For instance, morbidity from diphtheria-one of the most serious and widely spread infectious diseases of children and young people during the interwar period rose markedly increased after the mid-1920s, doubled again between 1932 and 1937, and reached extremely high levels during the war only to decline rapidly thereafter.
Notes
Anthropometric indicators of the quality of nutrition
Anthropometric indices have been used by economic historians and development economists to study nutritional status (on the Soviet Union see Wheatcroft,1999, pp. 27-60; Komlos, 1999, pp. 71-79; Mironov, 1999, pp. 80-90 . On China see Morgan, 1988, pp. 19-20. On the GDR, see Hermanussen, 1997, pp. 135-141 . A summary is given in Baten, 2002) .
Children's heights are particularly sensitive to environmental conditions, as indicated by the decline in height during the hunger years of World War I in the city of Stuttgart 1912 1915 1918 1921 1924 1927 1930 1933 1936 1939 
Height in mm
Girls 8 years
Girls 9 years
Boys 8 years
Boys 9 years
Source: Tanner (1990) .
(see also Tanner, 1994, p. 3 and for a detailed time series analysis, see Baten, 2000, pp. 20-22) . The increases in physical stature were remarkably large during the 1920s among both boys and girls, but then slowed down, and ceased or even reversed in the 1930s. The only other German series that survives for this period, that for Leipzig, in Saxony, the reversal of the positive secular trend was as dramatic as in Stuttgart. 7 1918 1921 1924 1927 1930 1933 1936 1939 1942 1945 1948 1951 Height in cm Source: Koch, E. (1953) , cited after Marcusson (1962) . Source: Floud and Harris (1997). In contrast, heights of other European and American urban populations increased. Leeds, Glasgow, and eight other towns in Great Britain are just some examples ( Figure 4 ). Other similar evidence exist for the Netherlands, and for Pittsburgh, USA, during the Great Depression (Drukker and Tassenaar, 1997, pp. 331-377; Wu, 1992) . The Soviet Union might be a counter example, insofar as heights did not increase much there during the 1920s and most of the 1930s. Only during the late 1930s was there a substantial increase in height (Baten, 2002) . 8 Moreover, right after Mussolini had introduced a partial autarchy policy in the late 1920s, Italian heights increased much less than, say, Dutch heights (Ibdm.). 9 In other words, heights were generally increasing vigorously in most countries during the 20 th century, due primarily to improvements in food production and in health technology. The stagnation or decline of heights can thus be interpreted as an indication of nutritional problems.
In sum, stagnating heights of schoolchildren, interruption or reversal of the mortality decline, particularly of children, and high morbidity rates from diphtheria, all suggest that the biological standard of living in Germany was either declining, or was at most constant during the first years of Nazi rule. Relative to the achievements of other countries, it most certainly deteriorated. What could have been the factors behind such a development?
Explaining the crisis in the biological living standard
It is widely assumed that economic growth can improve physical well-being because it enables people to purchase a more nutritious diet, better housing, and more medical care, all of which are important to health. Because the relative deterioration of the biological living standard, accompanied by rising GDP per capita, was due to a decline in disposable income for some segments of the society through rising inequality, the related developments is briefly outlined. We also consider the hypothesis, that a growing physical exertion from intensive work, specifically in the armament industry, damaged workers' health (Hachtmann, 1989, pp. 231-253 . See also Geyer, 1989 , pp. 392-397. Similarly Mason, 1977 . For a differing opinion see Werner, 1983, pp. 21-26) .
Persecution for racial and political reasons of important segments of the German society undoubtedly also had a negative impact on living standards in at least two ways: directly, through higher number of deaths from violence or suicides, and indirectly, through a deterioration in the delivery of medical services as Jews were forced to stop practising medicine and teaching in universities. With respect to the whole population, however, these effects may have played a greater role only after 1938.
Another set of determinants may be linked to malnutrition. Contemporaries emphasised the scarcity of food supply in the Third Reich even before World War II, especially the lack of animal proteins and fat, which was often discussed intensively under the terminus technicus Fettluecke (shortage of animal fat) (Gumpert, 1940, pp. 77-80 . On the Fettluecke see Corni and Gies, 1997, esp. pp. 309-314) . Two related policies of the Third Reich, instituted well before the start of the war, are examined here-the effects of the autarchy policy and the problem of disintegrating food markets due to the newly created price-control system.
Income and income inequality: the economic recovery in the Third Reich, as measured by GDP, is well documented. Germany Notes: Germany: 1928-34 without Saarland; 1938 -1939 including the new territories. Source: Maddison (1995) , pp.180-183, Ritschl and Spoerer (1997), p. 51 Real GDP grew by some 55% between 1933 and 1937, and was impressive relative to the Netherlands, even if the recovery was not ahead of that of Great Britain and Denmark.
Furthermore, much of the additional output was spent on military equipment, thus, real aggregate private consumption increased by only 19% during that period of time (calculated from Ritschl and Spoerer, 1997, p. 44, tab.3) . Moreover, it seems that the lower classes could not profit from the economic recovery, insofar as personal income inequality widened during the Third Reich (Dumke, 1991, p.128 ). Labour's share of the total national income decreased, even if compared with 1929, the last pre-crisis year (although during crises wage shares generally increase), in spite of a simultaneously substantial reduction of unemployment (Petzina, 1977, pp. 121-122) .
The trend in real wages is still controversial, because price indexes are difficult to interpret.
Deterioration in product quality and the loss in utility due to non-availability of some goods pose additional problems of measurement. According to official statistics, real gross wages tended to rise in spite of the official policy that fixed some wages (Tarifloehne), and by 1938, industrial wages recovered to their 1929 level (one of the outstanding boom years under the Weimar regime) (Ibdm. See also Petzina et al., 1978, p. 98 and Siegel, 1982, p. 104, tab. 2.) .
However, reasonable adjustments to the official figures lead to a more sceptical view of the trends in real income, 10 and it is most likely that before the war German real weekly net wages in industry failed to recover to the level of 1929 (Hachtmann, 1989, p. 158 and p. 159, tab. 14. Overy, 1994, pp. 263-264) . In addition, females were actively deterred from participating in the labour force. Given that averages wages probably stagnated, and that the distribution of income probably became more uneven, it is quite possible that the real income of the lower classes declined, which could have contributed to the increase in mortality. On the other hand, the overall increase in total employment had certainly alleviated labour's losses, particularly if the situation is compared with the conditions during the economic crisis of 1930-1933. 11 The average family had more members participating in the labor force, and fewer needed welfare assistance. The real total household incomes were probably higher in 1937-1938 than at the outset of depression (before the Nazi takeover) even if the real wages of individuals did not recover as unambigously (e.g., Oppenheimer-Bluhm, 1965, pp. 69-70; Kranig, 1992 , p. 144. Werner, 1983 . Thus, the conclusion emerges that private incomes certainly did not increase as much as GDP growth rates would suggest, but there is no strong evidence that income levels of the lower classes declined to such an extent as to account for a deterioration of the biological standard of living.
Growing physical exertion from more intensive work: Increases in weekly wages were generated by longer working hours, not by an increase in the hourly wage rate. By 1938, the number of hours worked per week rose by 3.6 hours (compared with 1933), while the trend during the Weimar Republic had been in the opposite direction (Bry, 1960, p. 48) . The increase in working hours was accompanied by greater physical exertion from more intensive work with a negative impact on workers' health. The incidence of industrial accidents also increased by 4% between 1929 and 1937 (calculated from Hachtmann, 1989, p. 248, tab. 24 ).
In addition, there was an increase of 15% from 1933 to 1937 in the rate of sickness among health-insured persons, even if sickness rates did not return to the levels of the late 1920s
(calculated from Hachtmann, 1989, p. 232, tab. 21) . These trends are not surprising, because fluctuations of both morbidity rates (gathered from health insurance companies) and accident rates are generally correlated positively with the movement of the business cycle. 12 On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that the National Socialist regime undertook several measures to prevent workers from calling in sick or to force them to return to work before they were sufficiently recovered (Hachtmann, 1989 , pp. 231-253. Knoedler, 1991 . As a result, the published morbidity rates may well understate the morbidity increase.
Yet, even with morbidity rates failing to reflect the workers' true health status, the relative deterioration of the biological standard of living cannot be completely explained by worsening working conditions, because the age pattern of the mortality change between 1932 and 1937 does not fit that explanation. On the one hand, mortality rates of children (ages one to fourteen) increased the most, and that segment of the population was not exposed to physical exertion in the workplace. On the other hand, mortality of people between 15 and 60 years changed very little. Accordingly, other influences that affect peoples' health at younger ages must be taken into consideration.
Medical services: Published statistics on health expenditures and the number of physicians are somewhat inconsistent. 13 Nevertheless, the available evidence implies that even though medical services (the numbers of hospital beds and physicians per 10,000 inhabitants) had expanded significantly in the second half of the 1920s, they did not improve markedly in the early Nazi years. The hospital beds per capita increased but slightly, but the number patients grew twice as fast as the number of available beds (Kater, 1989, p. 43 ). 14 Clinic directors as well as professors of medicine lobbied with limited success for extensions of existing hospitals and for the creation of new ones in the later 1930s (Ibdm.).
The ratio of seven medical doctors per 10,000 inhabitants was fairly good by international standards (Süß, 1998b, p. 204) , but it was below the peak Weimar level. Immediately after the Nazi takeover, the process of outlawing Jewish doctors began and escalated thereafter (in detail Kater, 1989, pp. 177-221; Kümmel, 1993, pp. 70-74) . By the fall of 1938 all Jewish physicians' licences were revoked, affecting about 8,000 to 9,000 doctors, -16% of all physicians (Kater, 1989, pp. 221; Kümmel, 1993, p. 74) . 15 Furthermore, the quality of medicine as a professional discipline declined through the exclusion of both Jewish medical students and scholars. 16 Tennstedt (1976) reports that the number of people receiving voluntary health services, such as recuperation measures and sickness prevention decreased by 70% between 1930 and 1937. 18 Public health measures: Formal public health services were increased during the 1920s, but were substantially cut back during the economic crisis until 1934 (Table 5 ) (Sachße and Tennstedt, 1992, p. 166 ).
Due to the creation of a state-centralised system of public health departments, those expenses more than tripled in the following two years to 57 million Reichsmark ( Suess, 1998b, p. 48), but they accounted for only an inconsequential share of total health expenditures, and for only 0.4% of the military expenditure in 1937. Therefore, only a very small part of the additional aggregate income was used for investments in the public health sector. Altogether it appears that medical services did not deteriorate dramatically between 1933 and 1937, even if it is possible to identify some adverse developments. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that the rise in mortality, particularly that of children, was caused by changes in the delivery of medical services to the population.
The Nazi population policy focused on the prevention of infant mortality, mainly through a wider public education of child care and the promotion of breastfeeding and healthy nutrition (Seidlmayer, 1937; Naumann, 1941 . For an overview about welfare for small children and mothers see Pine, 1997, pp. 23-38) . Totalitarian regimes are relatively efficient at reducing infant mortality, considering that the first 12 months are mainly influenced by parental behaviour and-compared with the mortality of older children-not linked as much to the availability of nutritional resources. Behaviour can be influenced by propaganda, at which totalitarian regimes are often particularly skilled (Baten, 2002) . 19 In addition, new and improved public health measures benefited infants. The number of maternity, child, and infant welfare centres increased from 6,617 in 1928 to 14,876 in 1937. Almost 70% of all live births were monitored by those institutions in 1937 (Sachße and Tennstedt, 1992, pp. 166-168) .
Infant mortality decreased markedly by 18.7% between 1932 and 1937 (see table 2) . 20
Yet, in spite of those considerable efforts to improve infant survival, it did not do so any faster than in most other European countries during the same period of time (see Mitchell, 1992, pp. 119-120) . Contemporaries speculated in that the increase in fertility in the first years of Nazi rule could have led to higher infant and maternal mortality. Thus the impact of fertility increase on mortality is also included in our regression analysis below.
Much effort during the Nazi years was also directed towards older children, but it seems to have had only limited success. 21 Public health policy failed in the fight against diphtheria, the most important single cause of death among children between the ages of one and fifteen.
More children died from that disease (16%) than from tuberculosis (10%), pneumonia (14%), or accidents (11%) (calculated from sources from Table 6 ).
As mentioned above, morbidity rates from diphtheria increased after 1925 in Germany, as in many other countries. However, German health authorities introduced vaccination programmes slowly compared to international standards (for the following see Suess 1998b, 
Did malnutrition play a role in the mortality trends?
Infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, respiratory infections (bacterial and viral), measles, whooping cough, bacterial diarrhea, and some parasitic diseases are definitely influenced by the nutritional status (Lunn, 1991, p. 137) . Diphtheria and influenza are at least partly affected by nutrition, and mortality from respiratory diseases (such as pneumonia and bronchitis) and
diseases of the digestive system are most likely linked to the nutritional status. In contrast, mortality from diseases such as tetanus, malaria, smallpox, and yellow fever are independent of nutritional status as are deaths due to non-communicable diseases, such as cancer, as well as from violence. Table 6 presents differences in percentage points in cause-specific, agestandardised mortality rates in Germany in three time periods : 1925-1932, 1932-1935, and 1935-1937. 24 Positive values indicate that cause-specific mortality increased. During the Weimar period (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) all causes of death that were certainly or possibly associated with the nutritional status declined. By contrast, mortality from most of those causes, such as acute childhood infections, influenza, and pneumonia, increased in the second half of the 1930s, compared to 1932. Only tuberculosis continued to decline in the 1930s, probably due to the implementation of mass X-ray screening, which helped identify tuberculosis at an early stage, 25 but that decline was slower than it had been from 1925 to 1932.
The overall increase in infectious diseases in the 1930s is unexpected, inasmuch as the model of the epidemiological transition implies that during the 1930s mortality caused by degenerative diseases would increase, but mortality from communicable diseases would decline. 26 In sum, mortality from several infectious childhood diseases and from pneumonia rose in Germany in the 1930s, whereas those causes of death had been substantially reduced from 1925 to 1932. Because most of those diseases are related to protein deficiency at least to some extent, the inference is warranted that nutrition may well have played a role in the deteriorating mortality regime in Germany of the 1930s.
The impact of autarchy and price control on regional mortality
What could have influenced the quality of nutrition sufficiently to affect mortality rates, if real family incomes did not decline? One important aspect of nutrient quality is the amount of proteins available, as these are essential for the proper functioning of the immune system and all living cells, even if temporary decrease in protein intake does not have immediate deleterious consequences. 29 One should also consider the regional differences in consumption patterns particularly those caused by the Nazi autarchy policy.
Currency reserves were extremely limited during the depression, and the high-tariff policies of many countries, but especially the overvaluation of the German Mark not only prevented Germany from increasing its exports but also greatly limited its imports. 30 However, the balance-of-payment argument is only partially valid, insofar as Germany did import raw materials for rearmament. The currency used to buy Swedish iron could have just as easily bought Danish cattle. In addition, the balance-of-payment was only one of the two reasons for the switch to an autarchy policy. The other one was motivated by military purposes. During WW I the German population had gone from hunger to revolution-and that dramatic experience had to be avoided at any cost. So food imports did not stop in the 1930s, but their protein content was less than in the 1920s. In the 1930s more grain was imported from southeastern Europe, but food imports did not increase as much it would have been possible and expected as GDP increased-balance of payments notwithstanding-because of the import substitution from food to raw materials for rearmament (Hoffmann, 1965, pp. 524-525) .
The impact of the autarchy policy on the coastal areas was dramatic. In Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg 37% and 65% fewer cattle were slaughtered in 1936 than in 1929, because of the limitation on imports of live cattle. The trends were similar in the port cities. In contrast, cattle slaughtering increased in the more agricultural regions of the South and Southeast, and remained constant in Berlin, indicating the regional diversity of the autarchy policy. We are focusing on beef as a protein-intake indicator not because of its nutritional value but because of the availability of data. We would have preferred to include pork and milk consumption, but the lack of extant statistics prevents us from doing so. The Nazis were eager to keep prices artificially low for milk and bread (and to some extent for pork), but they were much less concerned about beef, and consequently beef prices were set by market forces. Given the possibility of substituting among food products, the high beef prices also imply that other meat and dairy products were scarce. The controlled low prices led to decreasing supply, as many farmers who previously concentrated on dairying switched to beef production, especially in the regions with high beef prices.
The amount of beef that an unskilled wage earner could buy was, indeed, declining sharply in the Northwest by 8%. Sigmar.
Stade
Starkenb.
Stettin Trier
Unterfr. The dairy region of Muensterland was affected less, and the regions along the Dutch border were also doing better. Nonetheless, the whole Northwest faced worse conditions than the South and Thuringia. The East took an intermediate position. Danish cattle and Dutch meat were definitely in short supply in the Northwest. 31 If we compare this indicator of protein shortage with the regional differences in mortality increase, the parallel is striking ( figure 6 and 7). Potsdam, the region around Berlin, and the Saxon area of Zwickau did somewhat worse than expected on the basis of our protein-shortage indicator.
The second source of regional inequality was the introduction of regulation of the price of food. The policy posed a dilemma for the Nazi government because many farmers had been strong supporters of the NS movement from the very beginning, and as a result they expected high prices for their products (Corni and Gies, 1997, pp. 309-314) . At the same time, Hitler feared dissatisfaction from people living in industrial cities that could have threatened the smooth functioning of the armament industries. The solution was to regulate prices and to reduce the profits of the food merchants which required an enormous bureaucratic effort.
Anti-Semitic motivations further reinforced that policy approach. Sigmar.
Stade
Stettin Trier
Unterfr. The result was, of course, a less-efficient food distribution system. If profits are artificially reduced, more and more firms move out of the trade, hindering the interregional exchange of products.
As a consequence, the integration of food markets between rural and urban areas was breaking down, and farmers had an incentive to consume more foodstuffs within their own households. This was especially the case with perishables. Based on evidence from Munich and Dresden, the result was a diminution in urban meat consumption, which is mirrored by the increase in mortality.
According to Prussian data, larger cities, with 100,000 and more inhabitants, experienced a more significant increase in mortality, than smaller ones, and small towns (15-30,000 inhabitants) even had declining mortality experience. It may well be that small towns had better access to food on account of their rural surroundings. City size: a=100,000 and more, b=50-100,000, c=30-50,000, d=15-30,000 inhabitants) Sources: Calculated from Statistische Sonderbeilage zur Nr. 11 vom 11. März 1936 des Reichs-Gesundheitsblattes; Nr. 4 vom 26. Januar 1941 des Reichs-Gesundheitsblattes. However, the decline in meat consumption was by no means large compared to the 1928 level. Several considerations question the validity of these official statistics. Firstly, we do not know the accuracy of these politically sensitive data in a totalitarian state that claimed legitimacy through raising welfare (Von der Lippe, 1996) . The numerous reports about empty shops certainly call into question their reliability. 32 In addition, a study by the US ministry of agriculture concluded that meat consumption of German workers decreased by 17% between 1927 and 1937, milk consumption by 21%, and egg consumption by 46%. At the same time, the much debated "Fettluecke" (fat shortage) resulted in a decline of fat consumption of "only" 7% (Franklin, 1940) . (2) Secondly, even if the official figures were correct: unequal distribution of nutritional resources would remain a problem. How much was locally consumed by farmers, who had a very favourable diet anyway? Hence, the national average is not very informative in this respect. 33 (3) Thirdly, the structure of consumption was much different after 1933. Proteins were clearly redistributed in favour of the military and probably to special national socialist institutions such as the Reichsarbeitsdienst (obligatory labour camps for young adults). More meat was served in restaurants than in private households, which was probably not beneficial for children's consumption (Bundesarchiv Berlin NS 5 VI 8983 pp. 51, 52) . It is not surprising that price controls brought about black-market activities.
Contemporary reports often mentioned the unwillingness of farmers to deliver fat and proteinrich products to the state food-collecting institutions. 34 The removal of Jewish cattle traders had a further damaging impact on market structure. Police and administration reports concerning the Bavarian district of Ebermannstadt make clear the nature of black-market activities (Broszat and Froehlich, 1979) . In September 1935, for example, the district administration reports that after the Milchversorgungsverband (milk-supply union) fixed the quota, there was "a great dissatisfaction among farmers. Food prices have risen…. The maximum price for cattle sales has often been exceeded and some farmers have not delivered the milk fat to the Rahmsammelstellen (milk-fat collection places), but instead they produced butter on their own and sold it on the black market" (p. 164). 35 One year later, in June 1936, the local police reported that "prices for cattle, butter, and eggs are very high at the moment.
Some of the farmers are very unhappy about the laws on butter, milk, and eggs" (p. 172). In September, another police station noted that "farmers unwilling to deliver their milk to the dairy farm (Molkerei) Plunck as the price of 12 Pfennig is too low" (p.177, "Plunck" is the name of the dairy farm). In November, the district administration recorded that "the milk delivery duty is still meeting with difficulties in some communities. Again and again, people try to produce butter illegally and sell it. The police is instructed to apply more rigid (verschärfte) controls and to act without consideration (rücksichtslos). During a control at the railway station in the village of Unterleinleiter a few days ago, no less than 193 pounds of butter was confiscated from four female traders, who planned to transport it" (p.178). These numerous black-market activities demonstrate how deep-reaching were the effects of the market disintegration brought about by the Nazi government's price-regulation policy.
We next test the impact of several variables on mortality patterns in 192 Prussian cities for 1932 and 1938, and on 66 German counties (Regierungsbezirke) for 1932 and 1936 using regression analyses. We can control for the increase in the share of old people to control for an age-structure effect in the cities. This variable does have an influence on total mortality (column 1) but not on pneumonia mortality (column 2). The dummy variable for "import region" (coastal regions plus regions along the lower banks of the Rhine, Elbe, and Oder rivers) has a strong effect, even after controlling for age structure. The mortality increase was almost 6% higher there.
City size was an independent albeit important factor. Again, the largest cities suffered most, experiencing an increase 18% higher than the constant representing the small towns. The occupational share in industry has an additional influence that is economically important.
More administrative or partially agricultural towns were doing better during that period, with industrial cities suffering more. We inserted the Jewish-population share to control for potential direct effects of persecution. This variable turns out to be negative, contrary to expectations. It is unclear why a higher Jewish share could have reduced mortality, but we can conclude that the rise in mortality of the population was not caused by the persecution. The goodness-of-fit measure adjusted R 2 indicates that the percentage of explained variance is a remarkable (41%). It is much higher than in the second regression that considers pneumoniamortality increases separately. However, pneumonia was also much more influential in the import region and in industrial towns. The Jewish share and the city-size dummies are insignificant.
The non-Prussian South was included in the county-level regressions. As an alternative to the import-region dummy we inserted the purchasing power of beef (a protein-availability indicator) in column 2. This model explains even more of the interregional variation of the mortality increase than column 1, with an adjusted R 2 of 0.51. The Jewish share is insignificant. Increasing crude birth rate contributed in fact to the mortality upsurge as contemporaries had argued-but it did not affect the significance of the import region or the beef-purchasing power variable. The unemployment share in 1933 denotes particular crisis regions in 1933 that presumably improved more than the average until 1936. Thus, the higher was the unemployment in 1933 the smaller was the increase in mortality. 36 The regression analysis indicates that mortality did, in fact, increase most in the large industrial cities and in those coastal regions of the Northwest that depended heavily on imported protein. That holds true even after controlling for changes in fertility, age structure, and unemployment.
Conclusion
We conclude that an autarchy policy was, indeed, highly detrimental to the health in an industrialized food-importing economy. Price and quantity regulations did not alleviate the situation, at least not for people living in large cities. We compare trends in mortality and nutritional status with other living standard indicators for the Weimar Republic (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) and for the early years of the Nationalist Socialist regime (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) . The economic policy of the National Socialists is often considered the one policy area in which they were successful (for a textbook exposition, see Hildebrand 1989). The popular impression is based on the drastic reduction of unemployment that had been extremely high during the Great Depression. 37 Totalitarian governments can reduce unemployment through public works projects and massive military spending, as well as stimulate profit expectations of industrialists within the framework of an imminent armament boom. Buchheim showed that Germany's recovery had actually started before Hitler's economic policy could have had an effect (except a psychological one that influenced expectations) (Abelshauser, 1999, pp. 503-538; Buchheim, 2001 ). Yet, the image of the Nazis ending unemployment is still dominating the popular view of German living standards in the 1930s. A discussion of the biological components of those standards is relevant and necessary to fundamentally change that impression. In sum, if biological aspects are taken into consideration, the Nazi economic policy was-in contrast to popular view-not successful in raising the welfare of the majority of the German population during the early years of the regime. Rather, it produced a majo crisis in health and mortality. Wheatcroft, S.G., 1999 , The Great Leap Upwards: Anthropometric Data and Indicators of Crises and Secular Change in Soviet Welfare Levels, 1880 -1960 . Slavic Review 58, no. 1, 27-60. Wu, J., 1992 , The Anthropometric History of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, 1890 -1945 Endnotes * I wish to thank the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung for supporting this research (A.W.). 1 One could also argue that the disaggregated perspective on morbidity, mortality, and nutritional quality has advantages over the Human Development Index (HDI). In the theoretical framework of the HDI the biological aspects of well being are captured by life expectancy alone. However, for a discussion of short-run developments within one country a more disaggregated measurement procedure can yield important insights. For example, age-specific mortality provides additional information on the underlying economic processes causing the trends. Of the other two HDI components the literacy variable remains nearly the same within our short time frame in such an industrial country as Germany under investigation. But the index of higher education clearly shows a decline. Moreover, the HDI concept can be modified to yield more accurate possibilities of measuring living standards (Wagner, 2002) . 2 We do not even know how German armament prices compared with world prices. 3 The pre-1938 period presents another advantage in that Austria was often included in the German data after 1938, making comparisons with the prior period difficult. 4 Crude death rates can be biased by the age distribution, especially in the long run. However, for short-run comparisons (half a decade or less), they provide useful evidence, insofar as the age distributions changes only slowly. It is impossible at this stage of research to calculate life expectancies for all the cross-sectional units used below in our regressions. However, we control for age shifts with the share of old people. 5 German death rates increased between 1932 and 1937, whereas those of the Netherlands and Denmark both fell slightly during that period (Table 1) . It should be mentioned, though, that there was no significant reduction in crude death rates in England and Wales either, contrary to the general European improvement in the 1930s. It seems as if both major foodimporting economies experienced problems in that period of market desintegration, but the present study shows that the German case was much more severe than the British one. 6 The Dasgupta/Weale Improvement Index (that adjust for convergence possibilities) is defined as follows: The question whether economic change can cause mortality increase in industrial nations was answered positively in the debate about the mortality increase in the Soviet Union of the 1980s and 1990s, and the mortality increase among East German older men in the 1990s. Note however, that completely different models apply to those situations in which the mortality increase was caused by a transition to a different economic system (see Dinkel, 1985 and Riphahn, 1999) . 10 Hachtmann (1988) suggested that the official cost of living index not be used. He argues that it understates real price increases, because of shortages and/or quality deterioration in certain consumer goods, hidden inflation, housing shortages, and so on. Recent research by André Steiner und Christoph Buchheim confirms this view. Hachtmann considers a figure that was mentioned in an unofficial document to be more reliable. In addition, he calculated the allowance for increased compulsory or quasi-compulsory levies. On the other hand, even if we would allow the cumulative inflation in food prices to be two to three times higher than the official index indicates, we would still not obtain stagnating wage levels. As a first check, note that wholesale prices of foodstuffs increased by 24% from 1933 to 1938, while the CPI reports only a 7% cumulative increase in the same category. Arguably, wholesale prices (WPI) were politically less visible and their statistics less likely to be rigged than the CPI series. Using the WPI deflator for foodstuffs to deflate wages would thus decrease real wages by two thirds. The compulsory deductions included contributions to social insurance institutions and direct taxes such as income and citizen taxes. Voluntary contributions embraced regular contributions to the Party, the Labour Front, the "Peoples's Welfare," and other public or semi-public organisations (Oppenheimer-Bluhm, 1965, pp. 20, 23; Siegel, 1982, p. 105; Hachtmann, 1988, pp. 34-47) . 11 Even if not everyone would accept the decrease in unemployment between 1932 to 1935 at face value. Silverman (1988) expressed doubts about the Nazi statistics but did not estimate the degree of falsification (see also Buchheim, 1994) . 12 Lower unemployment tends to lead to a higher propensity to claim insurance payments, whereas higher unemployment often makes people go to work even if they are not feeling well. Moreover, more people in a poor health status are employed in a full-employment economy than during a period of high unemployment. 13 For example, the number of physicians published in Statistische Jahrbücher differs from those compiled by the medical bureaucracy (Kater, 1989, p. 267) . Similarly, the health companies' expenditures on medical treatments are slightly inconsistent. They vary among publications, because the types of health insurance companies included varied. 14 For the number of hospital beds and their number of patients see also Sachße and Tennstedt (1992) , p. 176, Tab. 2.18. 15 Despite that considerable loss, a substantial supply shortage was not openly discussed before the beginning of the war. However, it should be borne in mind that the consequence of outlawing Jewish or politically suspect doctors from the profession may have been more severe at the local level. The number of Frankfurt's local health insurance doctors (AOK Frankfurt) decreased from 455 to fewer than 350 between 1932 and 1938 (Hitzler, 1952, p. 19 ). In addition, the deterioration of the general health situation may have increased demand and caused a marked decline in the doctor-patient ratio (Kater, 1989, p. 41) . 16 Changes in the medical curriculum also had an adverse impact on the training of doctors. Traditional medical subjects were abridged to make room for such fields as race hygienics (e.g., Kater, 1989, pp. 46172, 174; Van der Bussche,1993, pp. 117-128) . 17 On a local level, the nominal expenditure for medical treatments per member of the Frankfurt's local health insurance company (AOK Frankfurt) increased after the Depression, but it did not recover to the levels of the late 1920s (Hitzler, 1952, p. 19) . 18 The numbers were 1930: 89,613, 1931: 43,367, 1932: 8,584, 1933: 7,186, 1934: 12,087, 1935: 24,374, 1936: 27,014, 1937: 27,000 . The slight recovery in these numbers after 1934 was due to the Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Offspring from July 14 1933 because costs for these measures were recorded under the title "illness prevention and recovery measures". 19 But totalitarian regimes are also good at short-circuiting public lobbying for social benefits -which often leads to suboptimal outcomes. 20 This does not include deaths caused by congenital malformations. Infant mortality from congenital malformations may have increased because those infants were neglected or killed. However, it could also be that more diseases were recorded under that category. This pattern of change in causes of death reflects the ambiguous character of Nazi population policy: while it tried to "eliminate" those who were taken as "racially and hereditarily inferior," it supported those who were seen as both "hereditarily healthy and productive" members of the society. 21 Most efforts were directed towards schoolchildren through health supervision including medical, dental, and orthopaedic inspection, physical education, control of infectious diseases in schools, sanitation of school premises, supervision as well as recuperation measures of sick children, education about genetics and racial hygiene (Hecker, 1954, pp. 110-117. Sachße and Tennstedt, 1992, pp. 168-169) . 22 Some American cities such as New York successfully conducted vaccination programmes against diphtheria before the 1930s (Hammonds, 1999) . 23 Contemporaries were aware of the higher German morbidity rates from diphtheria than in other countries (Gumpert, 1940, p. 56; Gundel, 1936, p. 14.) 24 Standardised mortality rates were calculated because diseases affect people differently depending on their age. The standardised death rates used represent the mortality of the inhabitants in the various years, assuming the structure of the population at risk was the same as that of the year 1925. 25 Earlier diagnoses improved the chances of cure (Blasius, 1996, p. 330-331) . The prompt identification of potential carriers of the TB bacillus became also progressively more necessary because of the new collective National socialists mass organisations (Sachse and Tennstedt, 1992, p. 170 ). Thus mass screening was prevelant in the army. In Königsberg, all new recruits doing compulsory military service were X-rayed by the fall of 1935. The number of people X-rayed increased considerably under the Nazis (Proctor, 1999 , p. 87-88. Szerreiks, 1939 . By 1937, tuberculosis welfare centres administered 1.5 million X-rays in the Reich (Sachße and Tennstedt, 1992, p. 170) . 26 Applying the model of the epidemiological transition, Spree (1992) argued that the transitional phase (the age of declining epidemics) ended after the First World War and the so-called age of degenerative and man-made diseases started in Germany. Thus, the period under investigation belongs to phase three of the epidemiological transition and should be characterised by an increasing importance of cancer and diseases of the heart and circulatory system. 27 The comparison of cause-specific crude death rates between Germany and England & Wales is somewhat distorted because of the differences of the population at risk between Germany and England & Wales. Yet, the age structure of the population of both countries was fairly similar in the early 1930s. Age-structure of the population (in % of the total population), Germany (1933) ; Mitchell, 1988, p.15. 28 In fact, protein consumption per capita (meat, milk, and eggs) was higher in England than in Germany in the mid-1930s (Von der Decken, 1937 . 29 The desire for protein by the human organism is not overwhelmingly strong: one does not necessarily experience a feeling of starvation when proteins are missing from the diet. 30 Not all currencies were convertible, as large share of Germany's trade were channelled into bilateral clearing arrangements; Germany's disappointing export performance also had to do with its default of 1933. 31 Other regional differences stem from the possibilities to increase local protein production. For example, in Thuringia protein consumption was increased, whereas in Hesse, with its traditionally high protein production, there were no suitable factor inputs left to increase protein production. In Mecklenburg there was an increase in non-market consumption (meat and milk that was previously bought on markets, but subsequently were purchased directly from the farmers) that did keep the prices within bounds. 32 Hinze (1993) , reports on the year 1935 that beef, pork and fat is not available. Source: LB Stapo 6/1935 Auszug aus folgenden Archivalien GStA, Nr. 2,4, Bl. 29, p. 54, and "....the population receives generally in the cities of my county not enough pork, and not enough fat originating from cattle and pigs, because of insufficient supply. A strong under-supply of all necessary fats characterizes human nutrition.... butter is not available, not even in the large cities....RP 6.10.1935", there are
